Introduction
After a long process of consultation, the Defamation Act 2013 ('the 2013 Act') implemented a wide range of reforms to the tort of defamation. Among the most significant of these reforms was the introduction, in section 1 (2) , of a requirement to demonstrate 'serious financial loss', which applies to for-profit companies suing in libel or slander. Section 1 reads as follows:
(1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.
(2) For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit is not "serious harm" unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss.
Although this was a substantial change in the law, overturning the long-standing rule that proof of actual damage was not required of corporate defamation claimants, 1 it did not go as far as some reform campaigners recommended. Several groups and experts argued for the complete removal of the right to sue from some or all companies. 2 Parliament decided against taking this approach, and in fact the 2013 Act places the corporate right to sue on a statutory footing for the first time. 3 Throughout the reform debate, certain key themes recurred in discussions of the suitable approach to take to corporate defamation claimants. Those advocating reform often suggested that the risk of claimants abusing libel laws to stifle criticism was particularly pronounced with respect to corporate claimants. Other common arguments included that corporations had 9 claims brought by non-human legal persons. 'Non-human legal persons' means all claimants that are not human beings, and therefore includes corporations and firms. 28 It would be dishonest to suggest that the ten-year time frame was initially chosen for any reason other than ten being a round number. Nevertheless, the choice has advantages. Firstly, it allows time for the courts, and parties to litigation, to have adjusted to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Civil Procedure Rules. 29 Secondly, the High Court began publishing its judgments under neutral citations in 2002, meaning that (in theory 30 ) all relevant judgments should be available throughout the period studied. Although the judgments toward the latter end of the period could not have been relied upon during the reform process, they are still capable of revealing the practice of the courts under the libel regime that existed before the 2013 Act: the courts' application of the law in 2013 was, at least ostensibly, unaffected by the passage of the Act.
31
The publication of judgments under neutral citations has another advantage, in that it alleviates the problem, noted by Franklin for example, of reported cases being given extra weight. 32 In order to prevent this effect from creeping back in to the analysis, material in the headnotes of reported cases was not used in the analysis.
To generate the data set, I conducted searches on both Westlaw and Lexis for judgments with either 'defamation', 'slander' or 'libel' in the keywords or headnote. Judgments were collected for all cases in which one or more of the claimants was non-human, and in which one or more of those claimants sued either in libel or slander, or in both. Ascension Securities Ltd v Motley 28 Also included is a failed attempt to sue by an unincorporated trust: Case 43. 29 In October 2000 and April 1999 respectively. 30 See text to notes [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] . 31 As a result of the Defamation Act 2013, s 16, sub-ss (4)- (7) . See Case 37a [41] - [42] . 32 Franklin, 'Winners and Losers' (n 14) 461.
Fool Ltd was also included: although no cause of action was identified by the claimant, the judge in that case ruled that the applicable law 'must be' libel. 33 Although the date range for inclusion in the survey was 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2013, all judgments were collected from each claim with any judgment falling within that period (for example, the judgment in Ontulmus v Collett dated December 2014 34 was included because there had been a previous judgment in the same case in April 2013 35 ). Additional judgments referred to in the existing judgments but not listed on the databases were also included where available, mainly found through Google searches.
36
All available judgments in each case were considered for inclusion, but were rejected if they related only to a separate cause of action, 37 or if the non-human claimant had left the litigation before the judgment was delivered. 38 The final data set consisted of 89 judgments handed down in 54 claims. Because several claims were pursued by more than one corporate claimant, there were 62 claimants in total. More detail is given on the data set below. 39 Each of the judgments was coded on topics relevant to the research questions, and this along with other information was recorded on a spreadsheet to be analysed.
Limitations
The most obvious limitation to the method used here is that it only investigates a small subcategory of defamation claims; namely, those that progress to the point of being the subject 33 Case 5 [5] (Collins J). 34 Case 44c. 35 The sample size is not sufficient for any meaningful quantitative analysis to be carried out on the data. For that reason, only descriptive statistics (ie one in ten, or ten per cent) are used here. 52 Townend, 'Closed Data' (n 51) 32. 53 MoJ Consultation (n 8) Annex E: Impact Assessment, para 2.61. 54 A precise date is not available for Cases 29, 42 or 53, but the dates of the judgments would suggest that it is likely that at least one of these claims was also filed in the period in question.
construction companies, 61 and retailers.
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Almost half (24) of the claims were brought against human defendants only, while the remainder were split fairly evenly between those brought only against companies (13) and those brought against both humans and companies (17 more varied, although a substantial number were employees or ex-employees either of the claimant or of a corporate defendant.
Interestingly, around half of all the claims studied were brought with respect to internet publications only, and only three claimants that obtained judgment in their favour sued in respect of physical publications only. 63 Perhaps this is not particularly surprising, but it lends support to the perception that internet-based publications are increasingly becoming the norm in defamation actions. 64 The Twelve of the claims (just over a fifth) resulted in judgment being entered for the claimant, but two things should be noted about this figure. Firstly, three of these claims were brought against the same defendant, Rick Kordowski, in the long-running 'Solicitors from Hell' litigation. 69 Secondly, in one of those claims, only one of the two corporate claimants successfully relied on the cause of action in defamation. 70 In a further two claims, the claimant obtained judgment against only one of three defendants.
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At least eight claimants settled their claims, with the largest reported settlement being the £300,000 (plus over £2m in costs) paid to Collins Stewart Ltd by the Financial Times.
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Thirteen of the claims were struck out by the court. 73 One claimant failed to convince the court to disapply the limitation period in order that a claim could be brought; 74 and one failed to obtain an injunction before publication. 75 One claimant lost at trial; 76 and the only finding of liability made by a jury was eventually overturned on appeal. 77 In addition, at least three claimants abandoned their claims.
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The following four sections will focus on the findings of the analysis in relation to the main research questions studied. Some assorted observations on the data are then made before the paper's conclusion.
'Abusive' or 'trivial' lawsuits
Although noted already, it should be reiterated that the extent to which a study of court judgments can investigate the problem of abusive lawsuits, and the chilling effect that they cause, is limited. that in practice it may be extremely difficult to differentiate between claimants whose wealth gives them the capacity to stifle speech and those who have more limited resources.
The most important finding of this analysis in relation to abusive or trivial defamation claims is the simple observation that a worryingly large proportion of the corporate claims studied were criticised in some way by the courts. Of the 54 claims, 21 were the subject of some kind of judicial criticism.
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In relation to the issue of abusive claims, cases were coded into one of six categories, 96 as follows:
1. No mention of abuse or criticism of the claimant in the judgment(s).
2. Claim was declared by the judge to be 'abusive', 'vexatious' or similar.
3. Judge criticised the claimant's conduct or questioned its motive.
4. The claim itself, or part of the claim, was criticised as being weak or improperly pleaded.
5. Judge specifically noted that the claim, or the claimant's conduct, was legitimate (ie motivated by a desire to vindicate reputation) or not abusive.
6. Other -unable to categorise.
Only two claims fell into the 'Other' category. The first was Pritchard Englefield v Steinberg, 97 which was considered to be too difficult to categorise. The Court of Appeal, when it heard the case for the first time in 2005, investigated the basis of the claim in order to 'ensure that its process [was] not being misused', 98 and found that it 'was a long way from the situation found 95 Even noting the lack of comparative statistics, in any area of litigation nearly 40% of claims being criticised would be considered a significant problem. 96 Each case was placed into only one category. Where cases might have fallen into more than one category, the decision of higher courts was given more weight. Where they fell into more than one of the 'abusive' categories (2, 3 or 4) they were placed in the more serious of those. 97 Case 45. 98 Case 45a [20] .
Moir, Eady J agreed with the defendant's characterisation of the claim as an 'artificial construct'. 120 In Duke v University of Salford, the same judge regarded the basis of the 112 Ibid, [34] . 113 Ibid, [33] . It is interesting to note that both the High Court and Court of Appeal referred to the human and corporate claimants' reputations collectively as their 'reputation' -this observation may be relevant to the discussion on human claimants below, at text to notes 161-84. 114 Case 35 [34] . 115 Ibid, [54] . 116 Ibid, [52] . 117 Ibid, [51] . 118 Case 54 [4] . 119 Ibid, [65] . 120 The third category, in which the claimant's conduct or motive was questioned, contains ten claims subject to a range of criticisms. There were several cases in which the judge expressed a view that the claim, or part of it, may have been brought for a 'collateral purpose' other than to vindicate reputation. 125 Other claimants were criticised for their 'oppressive and bullying' 126 or 'extraordinarily lax' 127 conduct of the litigation. One claimant's conduct was considered to be 'highly unreasonable and well outside the norm', 128 while another was criticised for having 'no apparent concern about the costs generated' by the litigation. 129 The fourth category, claims criticised as weak or improperly pleaded, also contains a range of cases, with five falling into this category in total. In some cases, the pleadings were described as 'gravely deficient' 130 or 'rather contrived'. 131 In another, 'insufficient care' was said to have been taken with evidence presented to a Master when permission was sought to serve the claim out of the jurisdiction.
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The above might appear to paint a bleak picture of corporate defamation litigation, but there were five cases in the data set in which the judge expressly declared that the claimants were acting 'in good faith'. 133 Moreover, judges in a number of cases were critical of the behaviour of defendants. 
Claimants' alternative options
A common argument made by those who supported the complete removal of the right to sue in defamation from some or all corporations was that means of obtaining vindication other than a defamation suit are often available to companies. The argument is put in several ways. Firstly, alternative legal remedies -typically the tort of malicious falsehood -are considered to provide sufficient protection to corporate reputation. 148 Secondly, it is suggested that, in some cases, a corporation will be able to vindicate its reputation through an action brought by an employee or director. 149 Finally, it is contended that corporations have access to extra-legal means of achieving vindication, such as publicity campaigns, that tend not to be available to individuals.
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I should point out at this stage that I see all of these variants of the argument as logically flawed.
The availability in some cases of an alternative action in malicious falsehood, or any other tort, has very little in principle to do with whether a company should be entitled to sue in defamation.
As recognised by the Court of Appeal, the two torts 'have developed with different characteristics; they make different demands on the parties; and they offer redress for different 154 A similar point was made by Magnus Boyd, who suggested that the claim brought by Tesco against the Guardian was not an example of the chilling effect, because 'having been provided with a clear denial before publication (together with evidence), the Guardian still published the allegations.' Boyd (n 87). 155 Afia and Hartley (n 64) 189. may also be true -Andrew James Enforcement Ltd v ITV Plc appears to be the only case against a large media company brought by a relatively small corporate claimant.
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Regardless of the problems with the other two strands of this argument, it is important to investigate them for two reasons. Firstly, they were influential during the reform process, and one of my intentions here is to test the claims made during those debates. Secondly, if either of them is found to be true, then it may still make a valid contribution to a broader argument for reform. After all, if every corporate defamation claimant was also suing in malicious falsehood, and obtaining the same outcome through that tort, then one of those causes of action would be redundant.
Alternative legal remedies
The claimant(s) in 18 of the 54 cases asserted at least one other cause of action in addition to libel or slander. Predictably, the most common of these is malicious falsehood, pleaded in half of those 18 cases. In one case, the claimants relied on 'no less than ten causes of action ', 157 although this was an outlier -no other claimant relied on more than three.
Of the 12 claimants that obtained judgment in their favour, four relied on at least one alternative cause of action, 158 one of which was abandoned. 159 All three of the remaining claimants were successful in both libel and the alternative cause(s) of action.
It is interesting to note that, of the 21 claims criticised in some way by the courts, just six featured a claim in a cause of action other than libel or slander. illegitimately using the court process to silence criticism overwhelmingly do so through the defamation torts.
With regard to claims brought only in defamation, it is difficult to assess the potential applicability of a different cause of action. Nevertheless, combined with the observations below on human claimants, this study suggests that the 'alternative options' argument has some weight.
Human claimants
In almost half (26) 3. Reference to unquantified or unquantifiable loss.
4. Other -reference to some other kind of loss or harm.
No evidence of loss or no loss caused.
There are a number of difficulties with investigating pleas of financial loss through these judgments. Firstly, statements of claim were not readily available. In order to avoid the introduction of bias, those that were found were not used. Therefore, the results rely on the judge mentioning the extent to which damage is pleaded -hence, a large proportion of claims (18 of 54) fall into category one. Secondly, there was no requirement on any of these claimants to demonstrate loss (at least as regards their claims in defamation). Reliance on the presumption of loss does not necessarily mean that no actual loss was caused by the statement complained of, or that such loss could not have been proved. This is especially the case if one accepts Tugendhat J's statement on the presumptions of loss and falsity:
Claimants normally rely on these presumptions only during the stages of the proceedings up to the trial of the action. At any trial (or any assessment of damages)
claimants normally choose to put before the court evidence with a view to proving both that the words complained of are false, and that the claimants have suffered actual damage as a result of the defamatory publication.
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Given that only nine of the judgments studied were with respect to trials or assessments of damages, this effect -if real -may skew the data collected towards showing a failure to adduce evidence of loss.
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Englefield, there was no evidence of financial loss -although in the latter the human claimant would have been unaffected, and in the former there may have been a viable claim in malicious falsehood.
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The difficulty of assessing the likely effect of section 1(2) on the claims studied has already been noted. There may be some examples of cases that the courts could have dispensed with more efficiently had they had the 2013 Act at their disposal. However, there are a number of cases where it seems unlikely that the 'serious financial loss' requirement would have had a significant effect. It is important to note that even those claims that would have been struck out under section 1(2) could still have been brought, and potentially could have been the subject of several preliminary hearings. For those potential defendants with limited means, the expense of having a claim against them struck out at an early stage, although less than the cost of a full trial, is still sufficient to create a significant chilling effect on expression. In this sense, the effect of the 2013 Act, both in the courts and more widely, may only be marginal.
Categorising corporate claimants
As the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill noted, there is 'enormous variety in the size, available resources and influence of corporations', 209 and this variety appears to be reflected in the range of claimants that sued for defamation between 2004 and 2013.
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As a result, the nature of any reform directed at corporate defamation claimants was not the only choice that Parliament needed to make in the 2013 Act. Another important consideration was the scope of that reform; that is, which corporate claimants it would relate to. Parliament chose, in sub-section 1(2), the phrase 'body that trades for profit' to delineate those non-human claimants that would be subject to the serious financial loss requirement from those that would be subject only to the 'serious harm' requirement in sub-section (1).
Other The results of this study suggest that this is a very significant issue, and possibly reveal a fundamental difficulty with the law of corporate defamation. On the one hand, perhaps the most striking observation to be made of the cases as a whole is their lack of homogeneity. This might suggest that treating all corporate claimants in the same way would be problematic or unjust. On the other, concerns about the inevitable arbitrariness of a dividing line, and about the specific lines that have been suggested, are strongly supported by the data.
In Australia, one of the most significant criticisms of the law removing the right to sue from some corporations has been of its scope. In its evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, a committee of the Law Council of Australia reported 'a general consensus that the current corporations provision gives rise to serious anomalies, principally because of the arbitrary nature of the definition of "excluded corporations"'. 215 The difficulties faced in ultimately by an overseas company should be dealt with. 219 In one of the cases studied here, the judge admitted uncertainty as to the place of the claimant in a larger corporate group.
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The Joint Committee's observation that employee numbers do not necessarily reflect financial strength is also applicable to these other potential dividing lines, but using a direct measure of financial strength would also be problematic. Parliament's approach in the Defamation Act 2013 was to distinguish when a given claimant would or would not be subject to the section 1(2) restriction on the basis of whether or not it 'trades for profit'. The rationale for this distinction appears to have been to exclude charities from the ambit of the section, mainly on the basis that it would be more difficult for them to prove financial loss. 223 There may also have been a perception that the chilling effect on freedom of speech was primarily, or wholly, caused by for-profit companies. 224 However, the dividing line drawn in the 2013 Act presents its own problems.
The most significant problem is that non-human claimants that would not be covered by section 1(2) can, and do, abuse defamation laws. Mullis and Scott have suggested that, although 'any line drawn will be artificial', the Australian position (permitting defamation suits by non-profit organisations as well as companies with a small amount of employees) has 'the merit of recognising that the capacity of a very small company, or even a small charity, to threaten a national media group is likely to be limited.' 225 What Mullis and Scott did not mention, were introduced, 233 but this kind of action appears to be exceptionally rare. 234 If a fundamental aspect of the law of corporate defamation, and one that may allow future claimants such as the British Chiropractic Association to abuse the process of the courts, is based on the idea that charities might sometimes feel it necessary to seek a legal remedy for reputational harm, then future research testing whether or not this is actually the case would be extremely valuable.
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Perhaps the only consistent and principled way in which to approach corporate defamation claimants is to recognise the one attribute that they all share -they are not human beings.
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This fact alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that corporations should not be entitled to sue in defamation. It merely indicates that, whatever limitation it is considered appropriate to apply to corporate defamation claimants, it ought to apply to all of them.
Assorted observations
As previously mentioned, although the foregoing discussion relates to the main aims of this study, I did not want to ignore other interesting patterns that might emerge from the data. Two such patterns did, and they are addressed in this section.
Unrepresented defendants
The first is that almost all of the claimants that obtained judgment in their favour did so against defendants who were unrepresented or who represented themselves. There are a number of ways of interpreting this observation. One is that the courts are insufficiently accommodating to defendants in person. This would be consistent with a study by Chris Hanretty, which found that the relative experience of counsel had an effect on the decisions of the House of Lords. 242 If true, this may also be a factor in the 'inequality of arms'
problem, in that some corporate claimants have better access to experienced counsel than individual defendants. Another interpretation might be that unrepresented defendants are less likely to be advised to settle their cases. Either of these explanations would be supported by the fact that only two defendants appearing in person were not found liable. 243 The latter explanation would be consistent with the relative lack of media defendants in the cases studied.
It should also be noted that of the ten unrepresented defendants that lost their cases, four refused to defend the claim at all. 244 These cases may represent a 'last chance' for the claimant to obtain criticised for sending an 'insulting' letter challenging the claimant to 'bring it on in the USA'.
247

Publication on a matter of public interest: a fault-based corporate defamation law?
A further intriguing observation relates to the public interest in statements made about companies, an issue that has been highlighted by commentators as well as by the courts. 248 Although only nine cases involved discussion of the public interest in the statements complained of -probably due to the perceived difficulty and expense of pleading the Reynolds defence 249 -in almost all of those cases, the judge found that the statement was on a matter of public interest.
The only exceptions were two of the claims brought against Rick Kordowski. Both share an important feature: it was the publication of the statements complained of that was not in the public interest, rather than their subject matter. In other words, there was no case in which discussion of the activities of the corporate claimant was held not to be in the public interest.
Rather, where public interest defences failed, they did so because of the manner or The conflation of falsity and public interest in Law Society is unfortunate -the Reynolds defence was, after all, designed to protect the publication of statements not proven to be true 253 -but this kind of confusion may well be solved by the simplified public interest defence in section 4 of the 2013 Act, which requires that:
(a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest; and (b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest.
Although significant problems with the section have been identified, 254 the clear separation of the two limbs of the defence will likely have the effect of preventing issues relating to falsity or to the circumstances of publication entering into the court's decision on whether the statement was 'on a matter of public interest'. Applying this test, it is difficult to see how the allegations made in the Kordowski cases would not have passed the first hurdle (although they would have failed at the second).
Eric Descheemaeker has argued that the Reynolds defence 'represents the importation of what is in essence a negligence standard' into defamation law. 255 The limited information available from this study suggests that, when it comes to corporate claimants, this fault standard will almost always apply -albeit that the onus will be on the defendant to prove that publication was not unreasonable.
Conclusion
When this research was started, it was hoped that some of the many assertions and arguments made about corporate defamation claimants during the debates that led to the Defamation Act 2013 could be tested. It was also hoped that, by looking in more detail at the landscape of litigation to which the 2013 Act was a reaction, it would be possible to assess the 'serious financial loss' requirement in section 1(2) from a fresh perspective.
The findings, on balance, lend some degree of support to those who called for the complete removal of the corporate right to sue. The proportion of claims criticised in some way by the courts, and the number that were declared abusive, is surprising and concerning. The section 1(2) requirement may make some difference, by allowing the courts to strike out weaker claims, but it will not solve all of the problems with corporate defamation claims. Moreover, the restriction of the scope of that requirement to for-profit companies is unjustified in principle, and seemingly ignores the potential for non-profit organisations to abuse defamation laws in order to stifle freedom of speech.
Many of the claimants that were ultimately successful (even bearing in mind that some genuine claimants achieve 'success' through settlements without ever making it into a court room)
could have relied on an alternative cause of action, or achieved vindication through a related claim brought by a human. Despite the flaws in the argument that companies usually have means of obtaining vindication other than a libel suit, it does appear to reflect the reality of those corporate defamation claims that are heard by the courts. When one considers this evidence in light of existing research on the chilling effect that corporate defamation laws have on expression, it seems difficult to justify the continued existence of the corporate right to sue.
